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Abstract 
 
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an 
electoral campaign depends, among other things, on prior ideological beliefs 
about parties and/or candidates. Voters that are ex ante indifferent about the 
candidates attach little value to information because they perceive that 
voting itself will have little value. Voters that are ex ante very ideological 
also attach little value to information because they think that the news will 
hardly change their opinion.  Thus, high incentives to be informed can be 
found at intermediate levels of ideological strength. Moreover, the impact of 
increased political knowledge on turnout is asymmetric: New information 
increase the probability of voting of indifferent voters but decrease that of 
very ideological voters. These results are derived within a decision 
theoretical model of information acquisition and turnout that combines the 
Riker-Ordeshook (1968) approach to voting behaviour with the Becker 
(1965) approach to "personal production functions". These predictions are 
then tested on survey data from the 1997 British Election Study. Our 
empirical findings are compatible with all the results of the theoretical 
exercise. 
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1 Introduction
Individual predispositions like party identication and ideology are pervasive predictors
of voting behavior. In their celebrated book The American Voter, Campbell et al. (1960,
p.121) claim that "few facts are of greater importance for our national elections than the
lasting attachment of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties". This basic
nding has been more recently re-iterated by Miller & Shanks (1996). Erikson, Wright &
McIver (1993) have provided extensive evidence from exit polls data of the importance of
both partisanship and ideology in voterspresidential choices during the 1984 and 1988
elections. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have shown that changes in partisanship deter-
mine corresponding variations in turnout while Bartels (2000) and Hetherington (2001)
have provided evidence of resurging partisanship in the electorate, after a declining period
that reached its minimum during the seventies. Other national studies reach very similar
conclusions. In the UK, which will constitute the object of our empirical study, partisan-
ship and ideology probably play an even greater role, both having historically strong links
with social class and other economic and social variables (Bartle, 1998; Denver, 2004).
Empirical research on Britain consistently nds that voters with strong predispositions
tend to vote on the basis of their "general values and their overall perception of what the
parties stand for"1.
While partisanship and ideology tend to be correlated with interest in politics and
turnout, they are also often associated with unconditional voting decisions. This makes
it easier for politicians to abuse the trust they receive, making them less accountable
and less responsive to the public interest2. On a normative ground, therefore, partizan
and ideological voters can be contrasted with independent citizens, who make informed
and dependable decisions on policy issues (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996 and 1999).
A growing body of theoretical and empirical research has recently stressed the positive
1Heath, Jowell and Curtis (1985), p.107.
2Some scholars, however, argue that a long term relationship between a party and specic constituents
can help voters with little or ordinary political knowledge to take decisions that reect their interests
(Popkins,1991; Wittman, 1995; Lupia and McCubbins,1998) .
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role of voter information on the quality of public decisions (Besley and Burgess, 2002;
Besley and Prat, 2005). Better informed voters are both more responsive to platform
announcements and more likely to vote (Palfrey and Poole, 1987). Political knowledge is
also a very good predictor of electoral turnout, even controlling for a number of individual
characteristics3 (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Recent evidence also shows that the
correlation between voter political knowledge and turnout contains a strong causality
component (Larcinese, 2005; Lassen, 2005).
In spite of the growing interest in the role of information in elections and the well
established evidence on the impact of ideology and partisanship, relatively little attention
has been devoted to the important interactions that occur between political predisposi-
tions and political knowledge. Among the few exceptions, Achen (1992) proposes a model
of voter rational learning in the presence of exogenous information, assuming that partisan
attitudes are formed within a Bayesian updating process: new information receives less
weight when many pieces of information have already been received. This can explain
the stability of partisan attitudes after a certain age.4 On the empirical side, Palfrey
and Poole (1987) use ICPSR survey data from the 1980 US presidential election to show
that information is signicantly related to both political extremism and turnout. Voter
information is positively correlated with ideological extremism and negatively correlated
with indi¤erence between candidates. Moreover, not only are more informed citizens more
likely to vote, but their vote is also more predictable, in the sense that they exhibit less
randomness when voting behaviour is predicted using political preferences5.
In this paper I study the link between political predispositions and incentives to acquire
information and reconsider the relationship between prior beliefs, information and turnout
3Sanders (2001) studies the 1996 US presidential election and shows the importance for turnout of
perceived uncertainty about candidates.
4Gerber and Green (1996), however, show that stable party identication is not necessarily the con-
sequence of rational learning when party platforms are not stable over time.
5Preferences are recovered either by respondentsself-placement on a liberal-conservative scale, relative
to their placement of candidates, or from self-placement on a number of issues like defense spending,
ination or government aid to minority groups.
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under this new light6. I will generally refer to political predispositions by using the word
ideology. This is admittedly a minimalistic interpretation of this term, that is often used
to indicate broad theoretical constructions and general values that can often go beyond the
realm of politics. Our purpose is comparatively limited but the simplication proposed
captures an important aspect of ideology in politics: during elections, these complex set
of principles are translated into beliefs about candidates. This simplication allows us
to formalize an important point: That people with di¤erent prior beliefs about parties
and candidates have also di¤erentiated incentives to acquire information. In general, the
instrumental value of political information depends on the possibility (ex ante) that new
information may induce a change in behaviour and this, in turn, depends on existing
beliefs7.
The starting point of our analysis is a formal model that tries to capture the deter-
minants of citizenspolitical knowledge by combining the Riker and Ordeshook (1968)
model of the calculus of voting with the Becker (1965) approach to the modeling of in-
dividual production functions. Approaching voting behaviour by using the methodology
of rational choice theory, as I do in this paper, means that an attempt should be made
to also explain political information acquisition using the same tools.8 I present therefore
a decision-theoretical model where the demand for political information is the outcome
of a rational process, with its costs and benets. Information acquisition is modeled as
an individual production process, where inputs are mass media and time devoted to their
6On a purely empirical ground, the fact that ideological factors inuence information acquisition is
not a new theme in empirical social science: voters tend to select their information sources on the basis
of ideologies and partizanship and, for this reason, mass media have been often found to reinforce people
beliefs rather than persuade them (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944), Berelson, Lazarsfeld and
McPhee, 1954).
7Using the term ideology makes also clearer that, when I refer to partisanship, I am only using a
very narrow denition of the term, namely the belief that, prospectively, one party can satisfy ones
preferences better than others. In the literature, the word partisanship has often a broader meaning that
encompasses social identity, social class (especially in Britain) and sense of belonging to a given group.
Although these elements can be very important for voting decision-making, they are not the focus of this
paper.
8Matsusaka (1995) is, to my knowledge, the only work that considers the link between information and
turnout with endogenous information acquisition. This is done in the context of a decision-theoretical
model: increasing the condenceon the link between candidate choice and nal outcome, information
increases the probability of each voter to turn out in the election.
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usage. Citizens are endowed with di¤erent capabilities to acquire and process news and
are therefore able to grasp more or less information from the same exposure to media: In
this sense, a number of observable individual and systemic characteristics act as internal
and external constraints to the capability to be informed and represent therefore good
predictors of political knowledge. In this way, the model rationalizes several positive cor-
relations found in empirical research, like that between education and turnout (Wolnger
and Rosenstone, 1980; Matsusaka and Palda, 1999; Milligan et al., 2004).
Political dispositions are represented by prior beliefs about the quality of candidates.
In general, most people have their own prior opinions on political matters: these are
reected on both policy preferences and beliefs about how to reach given aims. These
priors can be shaped by the inuence of other people (e.g. parents), by a sense of belonging
to a certain group, by personal experiences and so on. It is out of question that such prior
beliefs, however formed, play an important role in voting decisions and on turnout itself.
Moreover, and more interestingly from our perspective, they can have an inuence on
the decision to be informed. The amount of political information that voters decide to
acquire during an electoral campaign depends, among other things, on prior ideological
beliefs about parties and/or candidates and it will be shown to be, other things equal, non-
monotonic in ideological strenght. Voters that are ex ante indi¤erent about the candidates
attach little value to information because they perceive that voting itself will have little
value. Voters that are ex ante very ideological also attach little value to information
because they think that the news will hardly change their opinion. Thus, high incentives
to be informed can be found at intermediate levels of ideological strenght. This theoretical
result is conrmed by an empirical analysis of data from the British Election Study (BES),
especially when left-right self-placement is used as a measure of ideology.
The impact of ideology and information on voter turnout is then reconsidered within
this extended framework. Ideology can now inuence voting both directly (as a prior
belief) and indirectly, via its impact on political knowledge. Nevertheless, the net e¤ect
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of ideology on turnout remains always positive. This is not the case for information, which
has a positive impact on the voting probability of non-partizan voters but a negative e¤ect
on that of the partizans. Therefore, empirical estimations of turnout that want to gauge
the relative impact of ideology and political knowledge should include an interaction term
to unveil the signicant heterogeneity of the impact of information. This result is also
tested by using BES data: All empirical ndings are again compatible with the results of
the theoretical exercise.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the main features of
the theoretical model while section 3 analyses the case of a non-polarized polity, when
each voter has prior beliefs that make her substantially indi¤erent (ex ante) about the
candidates. In section 4 I turn to the role of ideology, considering prior beliefs that attach
di¤erent values to the candidates. Section 5 provides some empirical evidence from the
British Election Study and and Section 6 concludes. Further details about both the model
and the data can be found in the Appendices.
2 The model
Consider a polity with two political parties I (incumbent) and O (opponent) and a set 

of citizens who vote to elect a public decision-maker. The incumbent politician decides
the value of a public policy parameter a 2 [0; a]. We assume a one-to-one relationship
between politicians and policies: in other terms (abusing the notation) candidate a de-
livers policy a. The incumbent policy-maker aI faces an opponent selected by party O.
The opponent candidate selection process is represented by a probability distribution
function FO(a);with corresponding density function fO(a). On the other side, when the
politician in o¢ ce implements her preferred policy aI she reveals her type to citizens:
therefore, while aI is common knowledge, citizens do not know the opponents type aO
but only her distribution FO(a).
Citizenspreferences over policies are represented by a utility function V (a): I assume
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that all citizens have the same preferences over a and that V
0
(a) > 0: In other terms,
a is considered as a valence issue, or a generally accepted measure of good governance.
This allows us to focus explicitly on beliefs rather than preferences. The validity of such
simplication rests, in the end, on the way the policy space is dened. In modeling voting,
virtually any policy issue can be represented as a valence issue with heterogeneous beliefs:
the most appropriate modeling choice depends then on the purpose of the model. This is
to say that citizens, rather than di¤ering on their nal aims, can be represented as having
di¤erent opinions on the most appropriate ways to reach their aims, if we redene what
we intend by aim. Let us take the example of health care: not many politicians would
claim they dont care about public health. However, di¤erent strategies to reach good
health services are rationalizable and are indeed rationalized during electoral campaigns.
Another good example is gun control: both the supporters and the opposers of increasing
gun regulation claim that their advocate policy is better for public order and in order to
increase the average citizens safety. Both cases are logically possible and evidence is often
not clear or easily manipulable: When the citizensutility function is dened in terms
of meta-preferences over nal private ends rather than over policies, then heterogeneity
becomes more relevant for beliefs than for actual preferences. Heterogeneous preferences
on policies can in this case be introduced at the cost of extra technical complications and
little new insights.
I assume then that citizens have di¤erent prior beliefs about the distribution FO(a).
The set of admittable prior distribution functions is indicated with F : During the elec-
toral campaign, citizens can gather information on the opponent candidate9. They are
endowed with an information gathering technology that is represented by the probability
q(t; kjE;M) to learn the realization aO: The inputs of this personal information produc-
tion function are an information source of quality k 2 K  R+, and time t 2 T  R+
devoted to extract information from this source10. The opportunity cost of time t is rep-
9This simplication is also not necessary, although considering information gathering on both candi-
dates would considerably complicate the model with little value added.
10Note that k is just a quality index and does not represent in itself specic sources. We only assume
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resented by w, while the marginal cost of quality in the information source is r. This
technology also depends on a vector of individual circumstances E that a¤ect the ability
to extract and process information or the capability to use more sophisticated informa-
tion sources. In empirical terms E includes variables such as education and age and,
for practical purposes, I will often refer to this parameter simply as "education". The
probability to learn aO nally depends on characteristics of the environment that may
a¤ect the availability and reliability of news on the media: I indicate this parameter of
information supply with M . There is an important di¤erence between k (the sources
quality) and M (information supply). The rst can be individually chosen, according to
each individuals interests and capabilities. M instead is exogenous and determines, for
each level of k, a shift in the supply of news. I assume that q(t; kj) is always increasing
in E and M and make the following assumption11:
Assumption 1 qt > 0; qk > 0; qtE > 0; qtM > 0; qkE > 0; qkM > 0; qtt  0; qtt qkk  
(qtk)
2  0
During the electoral campaign citizens acquire information and compare the benets
they would receive from the two candidates. Before the voting stage, citizens can either
be informed, if they observe the realization aO; or uninformed, if they dont. Informed
citizens compare V (aI) with V (aO) while the uninformed can only use their prior beliefs
FO(a). The benet from voting is dened as the (expected) di¤erence in utility from the
two candidates, taking into account the probability that each voter has to be decisive.
In the current analysis I do not consider non-instrumental motivations for either voting
or acquiring information. These, however, can be represented as constants, and would
therefore not alter our results.
that each specic newspaper, magazine, television channel or radio station can be mapped into the space
K.
11These are standard assumption to be made on any production function to ensure the maximization
process is well behaved.
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Finally, voting is costly: I represent the cost of voting with C 2 C  R+ and assume
that all voters have the same C: Each agent knows C: Nothing would change if we assumed
that C was distributed across the population according to any distribution function, as
long as the distribution of C remains independent of the distribution FO(a).
Finally, one of the two candidates is selected by majority rule and the elected politician
implements her preferred policy a: The sequence of events is represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Time Line
|
0a
|
0b
| |
1a 21b 1c
0a = Incumbent implements aI and reveals her type
0b = Opponent selection from distribution F (a)
1a = Choice of t and k (utility in rst period is determined)
1b = Realization of q ! bq
1c = Election
2 = Winning candidate implements her preferred policy: utility is realized
3 Information acquisition and voting
In this section I rst characterize the value and demand for information by backward in-
duction and then restrict the attention on the case of a non-polarized polity by introducing
restrictions on prior beliefs and cost of voting.
At time 2 the winning candidate implements her preferred policy: that will be aI if
the incumbent is conrmed in o¢ ce and aO if the opponent candidate wins. For brevity I
indicate V (aI) with VI and eliminate the subscipt from the functions F () and f(); given
that aI is known with certainty; where there is no risk of confusion I also use a for the
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opponents type, eliminating the subscript. T = 1 indicates the decision to vote (either
for I or for O) and T = 0 the decision to abstain.
The decision problem of an uninformed citizen at the election stage is then
max
T2f0;1g
T (P j
Z
[V (a)  VI ]dF (a)j   C) = fW (1)
where P is the (exogenous) probability to be a decisive voter.
For a citizen who knows the type of the incumbent the problem is instead
max
T2f0;1g
T (P jV (a)  VI j   C) =W (a) (2)
The ex ante value of an informed versus an uninformed decision is then given by
 =
Z
[W (a) fW ]dF (a) (3)
At the beginning of period 1 citizens decide about information acquisition. The opti-
mization problem for a generic citizen is:
max
t;k
q(t; kjE;M)  wt  rk (4)
s:t: t 2 T
k 2 K
Lemma 1 The expected value of political information is positive; i:e:   0
Proof: See Appendix A.
It is then straightforward to prove the following:
Proposition 1 The optimal functions t(E;M;w; r) and k(E;M;w; r) are both increas-
ing in E;M and decreasing in w; r. In other terms, the demand for information
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(both the quality of the selected information source and the time devoted to infor-
mation acquisition) is increasing in education and information supply and decresing
in the costs of time and mass media. It is then also true that the probability Q to
know a;dened as q(t; kjE;M) = Q(E;M;w; r) is increasing in E and M and
decreasing in w and r:
Assumption 2 Prior beliefs are such that the voters would not vote for any candidate if
uninformed, i.e. P j R [V (a)  VI ]dF (a)j  C; 8F 2 F ; 8C 2 C.
It is now possible to link the probability to be informed to the ex ante probability of
voting, i.e. the probability of voting before the actual type of the opponent is revealed.
This ex ante perspective is indeed the only one allowed for an external observer, at least
if we want to maintain an agnostic view about the actual quality of candidates and their
political distance.
In the following I assume that P [V (a)  VI ] > C and P [VI   V (0)] > C:
Proposition 2 @ Pr(T=1jQ)
@Q
 0: In other terms, the probability of voting for any candidate
is increasing in political knowledge, i.e. in the probability to know the opponents
type.
Proof : see the Mathematical Appendix.
This model links in a very simple way the probability of voting and a number of
individual and environmental characteristics, thus providing a theoretical foundation for
well established stylized facts on turnout.
Proposition 3
@ Pr(T=1jE;M;w;r)
@E
 0; @ Pr(T=1jE;M;w;r)
@M
 0,@ Pr(T=1jE;M;w;r)
@w
 0,@ Pr(T=1jE;M;w;r)
@p
 0: In
other terms, the probability of voting is increasing in education and in information
supply and decreasing in the cost of time and the cost of mass media.
11
Proof: see the Mathematical Appendix.
The capability to acquire information and the amount of information supplied increase
the probability that a citizen votes, ceteris paribus. This explains some common ndings of
empirical research, like the positive correlation between education and turnout, and at the
same time provides a direct link between the probability of turnout and the (exogenous)
cost of acquiring information.
4 Ideology
It is natural to think of ideology in our model in the form of prior beliefs about the
opponent candidate12. I start by dening ideology according to citizensbeliefs.
Denition 1 (Ideology) An I-leaning ideology (O-leaning ideology), or I-ideology (O-
ideology), consists of prior beliefs F(a) s.t.
Z
[V (a)  VI ]dF (a) < 0 ( 0)
A citizens ideology is dened only in relation to her beliefs. This, however, does
not guarantee that an ideological citizen votes if uninformed: a more stringent denition
of ideology would require prior beliefs to be such that, ex ante, the distance between
candidates is su¢ cient to overcome the cost of voting. I introduce therefore the following
denition:
Denition 2 (Strong Ideology) A strong I-ideology (O-ideology) consists, for given P
12It is clear that in the real world ideology concerns beliefs about all candidates: however what matters
for voting decisions is the perceived position of one candidate relative to the other and to the cost of
voting.
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and C, of prior beliefs F (a) s.t.
P
Z
[VI   V (a)]dF (a)  C
(P
Z
[V (a)  VI ]dF (a)  C)
To compare di¤erent degrees of ideology we need a further denition:
Denition 3 Assume citizens i and j have the same C and prior beliefs represented
respectively by the distribution functions F (a) and G(a): Then citizen i is more
O-ideological (I-ideological) than citizen j if
Z
[V (a)  VI ]dF (a) > (<)
Z
[V (a)  VI ]dG(a)
When we do not want to distinguish between I-ideology and O-ideology we can simply
say that agent i is more ideological than agent j.
It should be noted that in the Denitions 1-3, I consider a generic utility function V (a);
imposing no restriction on it other than being monotonic nondecreasing: The purpose of
the previous denitions is to impose restrictions on the distribution functions rather than
on the utility function. Given that we only want to characterize beliefs, independently
of preferences, what is required on the functions F (a) and G(a) must be true for any
nondecreasing utility function V (a). Now notice that
Z
[V (a)  VI ]dF (a) =
Z
V (a)dF (a)  VI : (5)
By requiring Denition 3 to be valid for every non-decreasing function V (a), the com-
parison of alternative distribution functions based on our denition of ideology is equiva-
lent to using rst order stochastic dominance. Under this more restrictive requirement I
13
can introduce an indicator of ideology that will be useful in the rest of this section13.
Denition 4 Dene  as an indicator of ideology s.t. an increase in  indicates an
increase of O-ideology.
Assumption 3 Consider two distribution functions FF (a) and GG(a): Then F > G
if and only if FF (a)  GG(a) 8a.
As  increases, agents become more O-ideological or, alternatively, less I-ideological.
As jj increases we will say that agents become more ideological (without specifying).
It is then possible to divide the set of prior beliefs F into three groups:
FI = fF (a) : P
Z
[VI   V (a)]dF (a) > Cg
FO = fF (a) : P
Z
[V (a)  VI ]dF (a) > Cg (6)
FA = fF (a) : jP
Z
[V (a)  VI ]dF (a)j  Cg:
Accordingly, we can divide the citizenspopulation 
 into 
I ; 
O; 
A; depending on
their priors: If uninformed about the true opponents type, citizens in the set 
I vote
for the incumbent, citizens in 
O vote for the opponent and those in 
A abstain. It is
important to distinguish this last group from the rest. I refer to citizens in 
A as weakly-
ideological, as opposed to the strong ideological agents in 
I and 
O: We can also dene
13Dening ideological beliefs using rst order stochastic dominance seems to make clearer the distinction
between private interest and ideology. In a sense, an ideological belief must be independent of preferences
(at least as long as we all agree on some basic premise, like that a is a valuable thing). If an individual
believes that F (a) stochastically dominates G(a) then he would recommend F (a) to every person with
a nondecreasing utility function V (a). This captures the di¤erence between the fact that F (a) is better
for the ideological person and the fact that such person believes F (a) to be better for everyone.
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 1; 0; and +1 such that
P
Z
[VI   V (a)]dF 1(a) = C
P
Z
[VI   V (a)]dF0(a) = 0 (7)
P
Z
[V (a)  VI ]dF+1(a) = C:
Then citizens are dened as strongly I-ideological when they have  <  1; weakly
I-ideological when  1    0; weakly O-ideological when 0    +1; and strongly
O-ideological when  > +1: Finally, it is useful to dene the following sets, corresponding
to possible realizations of the opponents type:
AI = fa : P [V (a)  VI ] <  Cg
A = fa :  C  P [V (a)  VI ]  Cg (8)
AO = fa : P [V (a)  VI ] > Cg
Being referred to realizations, and therefore to the case when the type of the opponent
is observed, the sets in (8) do not depend on prior beliefs. Figure 2 shows the partitioning
of the opponents type support in the case in which V (a) is a linear function.
The value of information depends on the decision the citizen would make following
only her priors. In particular, information is valuable because it might change the deci-
sion taken when uninformed. Consider a strongly O-ideological agent. As  increases,
the probability of realizations in AI or A decreases, thus rendering the possibility of
uninformed mistakes less likely. Therefore the value of information should decrease as 
increases.
For weakly ideological agents we need to introduce a further assumption.
Assumption 4 i > j )
R
AI[AO P jV (a)   VI j[fi(a)   fj(a)]da  C
R
AI[AO [fi(a)  
15
Figure 2: Partitioning the A-space
a
V
VI
V(a)
C
C
a
_
AI AA AO
p
I-Ideological O-Ideological
fj(a)]da:
This assumption is at the same time both a restriction on the distribution functions
considered, and a restriction on the possible partitions of the space A: Now consider
a weakly O-ideological agent, an agent that would abstain if uninformed. In this case
an increase in  decreases the probability of events in AI ; On the other side now the
probability of events in AO increases. We are left therefore with two opposite e¤ects
whose overall impact cannot be determined. Assumption 4 basically says that when an
agent is O-ideological, as  increases we expect the increase of likelihood of events in AO
to dominate the corresponding reduction of likelihood of events in AI (and symmetrically
for I-ideological agents):
16
It is now possible to state our main result.
Proposition 4 Indicate with F and G the value of information corresponding re-
spectively to F and G. Under Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 and for given E; M; w; r;
C, we have that
1) G < F <  1 ) G < F
2)  1  G < F < 0 ) G > F
3) 0  G < F  +1 ) G < F
4) +1 < G < F ) G > F
In other terms, the value of information is rst increasing and then, after a threshold,
decreasing in ideology. As a consequence, political knowledge is low for extremists and
indi¤erent voters and high at intermediate levels of ideology.
Proof. See the Mathematical Appendix.
Following the foregoing discussion, the intuition for this result has a simple represen-
tation in Fig. 3. Citizens that believe there is very little di¤erence between the candidates
(compared to the cost of voting) have little benet from acquiring information: the ex-
pected utility from an informed versus an uninformed choice is very limited as not much
di¤erence is expected. Citizens who are extremely independent in their evaluation of can-
didates can therefore be better classied as indi¤erent : they tend to attach little value
to politics in general and therefore remain generally uninformed. As priors become more
and more ideological, the demand for information increases, as the value of an informed
decision increases too. The value of information reaches its peak for those citizens that
are exactly indi¤erent between voting or not: for such agents observing the realization
of a carries a probability 1 of breaking the indi¤erence. Assume for example that agents
that are indi¤erent between abstaing and voting would abstain: there is then a very
high probability of a realization occurring in, for example, AO , thus making information
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Figure 3: The Value of Information
D
pp-1 p+1
p-1 s.t.òP[VI-V(a)]dF-1(a)=C p+1 s.t.òP[V(a)-VI]dF+1(a)=C
p0
extremely valuable. Citizens in a neighbourhood of this indi¤erence point can be called
independent and correspond to the idealized view of a well informed citizen. Starting from
this maximum, the value of information decreases monotonically for further increases in
ideology. This happens when citizenspriors are strong enough to induce them to vote if
uninformed: holding very strong priors means to believe that it is not worth to acquire
new information. I will refer to those agents as partisan.
Proposition 4 is stated for a given C. However, as C increases we should expect
the number of uninformed agents to increase: citizens that, in spite of being su¢ ciently
ideological, have a high cost of voting (think for example of citizens living outside their
home country) should remain rationally ignorant.
The remaining of this section links information to turnout.
Proposition 5
@ Pr(T=1jQ)
@Q
 0 for weakly-ideological voters and @ Pr(T=1jQ)
@Q
< 0 for strongly ideological
voters. In other terms, the impact of information on the probability to vote is positive
for weakly-ideological voters and negative for strongly ideological voters.
Proof: see the Mathematical Appendix.
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For weakly-ideological voters the situation is analogous to that presented for a non-
partisan polity in Proposition 2: information can only increase the probability of voting
for citizens that would otherwise abstain with certainty. Things are just the opposite for
partisans: information could lead them to discover that candidates are not as distant as
they perceived, thus inducing them not to incur the cost of voting. Thus, the impact of
information on turnout depends on the ideological priors of voters14.
It is important, at this point, to understand what is the e¤ect of ideology on turnout.
As discussed in the introduction, empirical studies tend to show that more ideological
voters are more likely to vote and there are many theoretically good reasons to expect
this correlation. Here, however, we found that ideology matters also for information
acquisition and, in turn, that information matters for turnout. What is the nal e¤ect of
ideology on turnout? Proposition 6 provides results that take into account the existence
of both a direct and an indirect (via information acquisition) e¤ect. Our conclusion is that
the indirect e¤ect is not enough to contradict the basic intuition that more ideological
citizens are more prone to vote.
Proposition 6 F > G > 0 ) Pr(OjF ) > Pr(OjG); F < G < 0 ) Pr(IjF ) >
Pr(IjG): If the function jV (a)  VI j is symmetric around 0 then for any two prior
distributions F () and G() jF j > jGj ) Pr(T = 1jF ) > Pr(T = 1jG): In other
terms, a more idelogical voter is more likely to vote.
Proof: see the Mathematical Appendix.
Before moving to the empirical analysis, it is opportune to spend a few words on the
impact of information on the quality of the elected candidate. We proved that weakly
ideological citizens increase their likelihood to vote when informed, while strongly ideo-
logical ones increase their likelihood to abstain. It is then clear that more information
14This result appears rather stark. This is due to the fact that, if the signal is received, citizens learn
the true type of the opponent. The asymmetric pattern would, however, remain even if citizens could
only observe a noisy signal. The important point here is that this result provides a guidance for further
empirical investigation. Attention will therefore be devoted to data analysis rather than to rening the
model under di¤erent hypotheses.
19
increases the chances to win of the better politician. This result, although derived in a
decision-theoretical context, carries implications for the literature on information aggre-
gation that associates better information with a higher likelihood of turnout. Our model
delivers such a link but also makes it conditional on votersprior beliefs. Information
is good because, among other things, can induce abstention of otherwise uninformed ex-
tremists: this increases the possibility of information aggregation to occur. At the same
time, it makes possible to argue that the possibility of information aggregation in elections
should be related to a number of individual (often observable) characteristics as well as
to specic characteristics of the environment, mainly related to information supply by the
mass media.
5 Empirical evidence from a British election
Some of the results derived in the previous sections provide rationalizations of observed
empirical regularities, others call for new empirical investigations. In this section I there-
fore provide empirical evidence that shows the compatibility of the theoretical proposi-
tions with data. For this purpose I use data from the British Election Study (BES)15.
The British system is parlamentarian and gives substantial powers to the Prime Minister;
the electoral system is rst past the post and the parties that realistically contend the
possibility to govern are two, the Labour and the Conservative. In this sense, the British
system ts our model better than most other political systems. There are nevertheless
some features of the electoral system that are not adequately captured by the model and
that will be discussed later.
15I use data on England, Scotland andWales. The political situation in Northern Ireland is substantially
di¤erent from the rest of the country as the main cleavage is between the Catholic and Protestant
populations rather than on the usual left-right dimension.
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5.1 Data and methods
I use data from the 1997 general election. The 1997 BES deals with information issues
better than any other previous or subsequent BES. Among other questions concerning the
election, respondents received in that occasion two sets of questions that can be used to
establish how much they know about politics. In a rst set of questions they were asked
to write down as many candidatesnames in their constituency as they could remember
(with a maximum of 6). In a second set of questions, respondents received 7 statements
on the British political and institutional system and were asked to say if they were true
or false. Both set of questions have been used to construct a variable (INFO) that is
then adopted as a measure of political knowledge16. Details on this variable (and on the
others) can be found in the Data Appendix.
The other crucial variable is ideology. Two possible measures have been considered.
One is the classical left-right self-placement, with zero being the extreme left and 10
the extreme right. I transform this variable by pulling togheter corresponding levels of
extremism on both sides. This leads to a measure of ideological strenght (Ideology) that
assumes a value of zero if the original left-right variable was 5 (i.e. the respondent places
himself in the middle of the ideological spectrum), 1 if it was 4 or 6 etc17. The second
indicator (Party) measures instead how close respondents feel to their preferred party (if
any) and has been built up by combining four separate questions. A full description of
the variable Party can be found in the Data Appendix.
Fig. 4 plots average information score by left-right self-placement. It mirrors with
16Delli Carpini & Keeter (1996, p.174), in presenting evidence on political knowledge of American
voters, based their analysis on nearly 3700 questions collected in various surveys. They concluded that
researchers developing national or general political knowledge scales need not be overly concerned with
the mix of specic topics covered by individual items. Scales made up of items tapping only knowledge of
institutions and processes, substantive issues, or public gures are likely to serve as reasonable measures
of the overarching construct. This is extremely important for us: the empirical analysis presented here
is based on a much more limited set of questions and I rely on the assumption that correct answers to
such questions are likely to be correlated with knowledge of other issues too. See also Delli Carpini and
Keeter (1993).
17"Dont know" responses have been included among the least ideological category. All regressions
have been repeated excluding these observations and the results show only minimal variations. These
regressions are available from the authour on request.
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surprising similarity the two peaks we described theoretically in Fig. 3. In Fig. 5 I use
the partizanship measure where 1 indicates no attachment to any party and 5 maximum
attachment to a party. Again, the simple plot of average political knowldege by parti-
zanship mimicks very well our theoretical ndings. These plots seem to show that the
distribution of information do interact with ideology and partizanship. Before jumping to
conclusions, however, it is opportune to use more sophisticated statistical tools and take
into account potential correlations with other variables.
I will therefore use regression analysis to estimate both a political knowledge equation
and a turnout equation. The rst equation to be estimated is
INFOi = 
0
1Xi + 2IDi + ui (9)
where ID represents ideology or party identication. Suppose there areK types of citizens
ranked according to the strenght of their ideological or party attachment. Then ID is
a categorical variable and K   1 dummies are introduced in the regression. We expect
to nd a non-monotonic pattern in such dummies, where estimated parameters should
rst increase with ideology and then decrease (Proposition 4). X represents a vector of
control variables including, among other covariates, education, age, sex and income18.
The BES data have been matched with Census data to also control for characteristics of
the electoral constituency such us socio-economic conditions and electoral closeness19. X
also includes proxies for information supply and the opportunity cost of time. This gives
us an opportunity to test the predictions of Proposition 1. Estimation is by OLS.
To test the predictions of our model for what concens voter turnout the following
18A number of respondents in the BES refused to disclose their income, which forced us to drop a part
of the observations. I present regressions both with and without income: in this last case the selection
bias is eliminated but at the cost of omitting an important covariate.
19In general, I attempt to include most of the variables that, for di¤erent reasons, have been considered
by the empirical literature on turnout (see for example Matsusaka and Palda, 1999). For this reason the
list of variables is quite long, and the standard errors are often high because of multicollinearity. However,
this strategy leads to robust results for what concerns our variables of interest and the only risk is that
of underestimating the parameters of interest.
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equation is estimed by probit:
Ti = 1INFOi + 
0
2Xi + 3IDi + 4IDi  INFOi + "i (10)
In this case ID is treated as a continuous variable, in order to interact it with INFO.
Indicating with ID the mean of ID, Proposition 2 requires that 1 + 4ID > 0 while
Proposition 3 places a well dened sign on a number of elements of the vector 
0
2: For what
concerns the interaction between ideology and information, indicating with INFO the
average of INFO, I expect 3+ 4 INFO  0 (from Proposition 6), and 4  0 (from
Proposition 5). There could be a legitimate concern about the endogeneity of information
in the turnout equation. I rely here on the ndings of Larcinese (2005), who also uses
the 1997 BES data and shows that, when standard controls are introduced in the turnout
equation, the omitted variables problem should be of limited relevance and therefore a
simple probit regression can be considered su¢ ciently reliable.
One important question I have left aside at the beginning of this section is how well the
model describes the British electoral system. There are at least two important features
that are not captured by the model: the rst is the division in electoral constituencies,
which makes voters choose one of many MPs rather than directly the Prime Minister.
The second is the fact that, although there are only two contenders for the place of
Prime Minister, there are nevertheless third and local parties that are quite strong in
some areas. This means that it is possible to vote strategically; also, it may happen that
one of the main contenders on a national scale is not a credible contender at the local
level. These features of British elections have certainly an impact on incentives to both
be informed and vote. For a number of respondents, incentives might have worked quite
di¤erently from how they are depicted in the model. To deal with this possibility I have
repeated all the regressions by using a reduced sample in which only observations coming
from two-way contests between Labour and Conservatives have been retained. In electoral
constituencies where the two main candidates are from the parties that are ghting for the
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government there is little incentive to vote for third parties and the process of information
acquisition should be approximately what the model describes. This leads us to exclude
more than one third of the observations but, as it will be shown later, has only minor
implications for the results.
A more detailed description of the variables is provided in the Data Appendix.
5.2 Results
Regression results are reported in the tables from 2 to 5 and provide a rather comfortable
picture for what concerns their compatibility with the theoretical model.
Table 2 reports OLS estimates of various specications of equation (9). In columns 1
and 2 I do not control for income, which gives a larger sample, while in columns 3 and
4 income has been introduced. Columns 1 and 3 use the measure of ideological strenght
derived from the respondents left-right self-placement. The ideology dummies display in
both columns the expected pattern: political knowledge increases with ideology, reaches
its peak in correspondence of the third group, for which it is also strongly statistically
signicant, and then declines and becomes statistically indistinguishable from the omit-
ted category (the least ideological). Columns 2 and 4 use party attachment instead of
ideological self-placement. The patterns of the coe¢ cients display again a single-peaked
shape, with the maximum reached at the fourth category in both columns.
The coe¢ cient of other variables of interest are also reported. First, in conformity
with previous ndings, better educated and older voters are better informed. To capture
the opportunity cost of time, I have used the only piece of information available from the
survey, the total number of hours worked, on the assumption that people who work longer
hours have a higher cost of devoting time to gathering news. The coe¢ cient obtained for
this variable comes with the expected negative sign and is statistically signicant (at the
10% level in column 3 and at the 5% level in column 4) when I control for income, which
is a rather important variable in this case, being obviously correlated with the number of
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hours worked. The e¤ect is not extremely large: an increase of one standard deviation
in the number of working hours decreases the information score by less than 0.2 in both
columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.
The supply of news also turns out to have a positive e¤ect on political knowledge, with
a coe¢ cient which is statistically signicant at the 1% level in columns 1 and 3 and at the
10% level in columns 2 and 4. On the aggregate, the e¤ect does not appear to be large:
one standard deviation in news supply determines an increase in the information score of
0.05 at most. The standard deviation is, however, not particularly high in this case. The
di¤erence between the constituencies with maximum and minimum news supply appears
instead sizeable, being equal to 3.3 in the information score.
Table 3 reports the probit estimates of the turnout equation. In all columns both in-
formation and ideology come with expected signs and are signicant. We intend, however,
to have a more stringent test of the model, which constists in a negative sign for the coef-
cient of the interaction between information and ideology (4  0). The expected sign is
obtained in all specications, although the coe¢ cient is statistically signicant only when
party identication is used. In this case we also obtain a larger Pseudo-R2; indicating
that this variable is better capable at explaining turnout than ideological strenght.
By using the coe¢ cients and the information reported in table 1 (summary statistics)
it is also easy to verify that the sign of 3 + 4  INFO is positive in all cases, which
conrms once more the important role of ideology in fostering turnout and the fact that
its net impact should always be positive.
One important question concerns the impact of information on turnout. Again, it is
easy to verify that the sign of 2+ 4 ID is positive in all columns: other things equal,
information increases turnout on average even when controlling for ideology. This result
corresponds to the common nding of a positive association between political knowledge
and turnout. However, having estimated the interaction term we can now uncover the
heterogeneity that hides behind this aggregate result. In fact, while the positive impact of
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information on turnout is rather strong for non-ideological and non-partizan respondents,
it becomes negligible or even negative when ideological strenght or party identication
reach their peak.
In Tables 4 and 5 I use only observations coming from constituencies with a Conservative-
Labour race. Table 4 shows some variations when compared with Table 2 but we still
obtain the same non-monotonic patterns in the impact of ideology and partizanship on
information. In fact, in this case the impact of party attachment appears stronger, in the
sense that everybody is now better informed if compared with the least partizan types.
Moreover, the decline associated with the most partizan group is now less pronounced.
The weekly number of working hours displays again a negative sign but this time is not
statistically signicant while the impact of news supply is stronger in columns 1 and 3 and
weaker and insignicant in columns 2 and 4. The turnout estimates in Table 5 only show
minimal variations when compared with the results of Table 3, but once again the impact
of party attachment on turnout appears stronger. Overall, it appears that party attach-
ment has a larger relevance in Conservative-Labour constituencies while other factors
become less important.
6 Concluding remarks
People learn if they have the motivation, the ability, and the opportunity to do so. There
seems to be little motivation for political information acquisition by voters: as for many
other situations involving collective action problems, voter turnout and information ac-
quisition in elections are complex social phenomena that are hard to explain with any
single-handed approach. It is, nevertheless, possible to make some progress when the
focus on motivation is replaced by a focus on opportunity and ability: although mo-
tivations to vote and to be informed clearly come from individual, often unobservable,
characteristics, the opportunity and the ability to learn will eventually leave their mark
on the amount and the type of political knowledge that citizens possess. Although not
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an exhaustive explanation, this methodology allows us to perform some interesting com-
parative statics in oder to derive novel testable propositions. This is the approach taken
in this work, where I try to link political knowledge and turnout with observable con-
straints and individual characteristics by developing a testable decision-theoretical model
of information acquisition and voting.
In this model citizens produce their own information by using mass media and
time according to a personal technology that reects their ability to acquire, process and
retain information. The parameters that determine di¤erent productivities in information
acquisition are then represented by relevant individual characteristics (like education,
income and age) as well as by the supply of information, in the form of mass media
coverage of political issues. This theoretical analysis leads to testable propositions about
the links of individual and environmental characteristics with citizenspolitical knowledge.
It is important, however, to distinguish the ow of information received during an
electoral campaign from the prior stock of political knowledge (prior beliefs). Such
knowledge is the outcome of individual history, from parentsinuence to other forms of
socialization and direct personal experiences. Not surprisingly, the perception of political
matters is generally very diverse across the population. I show that such diversity also
plays a role in the decision to acquire information and, then, in the impact that political
knowledge may have on turnout. In particular, the least informed citizens are, other
things equal, those with the weakest and the strongest ideological beliefs. In the rst
case, agents are ex ante so indi¤erent between the candidates that the expected benet of
acquiring information does not cover its costs: Thus, in contrast to what intuition would
suggest, extremely independentcitizens can be far from the ideal that a participative
vision of democracy requires. On the other side, people with extreme prior beliefs are
condent enough in their opinions and do not nd it useful to acquire information. Thus,
slightly ideological citizens turn out to be the most informed: This is a way in which a
moderate amount of ideological polarization can be useful to the functioning of democratic
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institutions.
The model presented is compatible with most typical results of empirical research,
like the positive e¤ect of education on participation. Moreover, through the interaction
between ideology and information, we are able to derive new testable predictions: of
particular relevance is the fact that information should have a positive impact on turnout
only for non-ideological voters.
Finally, since voters with strong priors make less-dependable choices, this result argues
in favour of the importance of information for good collective decision-making and the
accountability of public o¢ cials. One possible objection to this step is that this model
avoids the complications that arise when strategic voting is considered. However, whether
the vast literature on strategic turnout has delivered any practical insight into our un-
derstanding of political elections remains still unclear. This literature relies on the idea
that voting decisions should be made conditional on the probability of each voter to be
pivotal: In large elections (as opposed, for example, to a committee or a jury20) this sort
of strategic behaviour appears very unlikely and would require a degree of sophistication
that no voter has any incentive to develop in the rst place. A simpler decision-theoretical
framework seems more approriate in that it limits the rationality of voters in a well de-
ned way. The alternative o¤ered by models with bounded rationality often incur in the
problem of determining where rationality should end and how it should be replaced.
Some empirical evidence on these theoretical results is provided from the 1997 general
election in the United Kingdom. The results conrm most of the theoretical intuitions.
Individual and environmental characteristics generally come with the expected signs. For
some variables (like age and education) this is just a further conrmation in a well es-
tablished empirical literature. Other variables have instead been identied thanks to
20Before being extended to large electorates, the literature on information aggregation aimed at ex-
plaining the decision-making process of a jury with a common objective function. This is context in
which the celebrated Condorcet-jury theorem can be proved. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) make the
point that sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium with majority voting. Persico (2004)
provides the rst model of this sort with information acquisition and compares the properties of di¤erent
decision rules.
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the model: People who work longer hours are, ceteris paribus, less informed on politi-
cal matters and information supply on the press tends to increase political knowledge.
As predicted by our model, the relationship between political knowledge and ideological
strenght has an inverted U-shape. The empirical analysis also conrms that ideology and
information interact in signicant ways in their impact on turnout. Both ideology and
information display positive correlations with turnout. However, these well established
empirical regularities hide an important heterogeneity which, in the empirical analysis,
is captured by an interaction term: For more ideological voters the positive impact of
information on turnout is reduced. This e¤ect is found in the case of party identication
but not when left-right self-placement is used. Further investigation, beyond the scope of
this paper, should explore the reason for this di¤erence, probably due to the relationship
between ideology and partisanship in the British context.
This analysis has consequences for the way to think of the role of information and
mass media in democratic systems. Overall, our ndings show that information matters
for electoral behavior. However, because of its relation with ideology, information acqui-
sition in a polarized polity is limited, and ideology rather than information determine
policy outcomes. The same can happen to an extremely non-polarized population, with
a prevalence of indi¤erent voters. Thus, a limited amount of polarization helps reaching
informed outcomes. In this process, mass media and voterspersonal resources play a
crucial role: Formally democratic institutions might be emptied of substantial content if
accurate political information is either unavailable or beyond most votersreach.
References
[1] Achen, C.H. (1992): Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear Regres-
sion: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research, Political Behaviour, 14, n.3,
195-211.
29
[2] Austen-Smith, D. and J. Banks (1996): Information aggregation, rationality, and the
Condorcet jury theorem. American Political Science Review, 90, 34-45.
[3] Bartels, L.M. (2000): Partisanship and Voting Behaviour, 1952-1996. American Jour-
nal of Political Science, 44, n.1, 35-50.
[4] Bartle, J. (1998): Left-Right Position Matters, but Does Social Class? Causal Models
of the 1992 British General Election, British Journal of Political Science, 28, 501-529.
[5] Becker, G. (1965): A Theory of the Allocation of Time. Economic Journal, 75,
493-517.
[6] Berelson, B.R., P.F. Lazarsfeld and W.N. McPhee (1954): Voting. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
[7] Besley, T. and R. Burgess (2002): The Political Economy of Government Respon-
siveness: Theory and Evidence from India, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4),
1415-1452.
[8] Besley, T. and A. Prat (2005): Handcu¤s for the grabbing hand? Media capture and
government accountability, STICERD DP in Political Economy and Public Policy,
7.
[9] Campbell, A., P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller and D.E. Stokes (1960): The American
Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
[10] Delli Carpini, M.X. and S. Keeter (1993): Measuring Political Knowledge: Putting
First Things First, American Journal of Political Science, 37, n. 4, 1179-1206.
[11] Delli Carpini M.X. and S. Keeter (1996): What Americans Know about Politics and
Why It Matters, Yale University Press.
[12] Denver, D. (2003): Elections and Voters in Britain, Palgrave MacMillan.
30
[13] Erikson, R.S., G.C. Wright and J.P. McIver (1993): Statehouse Democracy: Public
Opinion and Policy in the American States. Cambridge University Press.
[14] Feddersen, T.J. and W. Pesendorfer (1996): The Swings Voters Curse, American
Economic Review, 86, 408-424.
[15] Feddersen, T.J. and W. Pesendorfer (1999): Abstention in Elections with Asym-
metric Information and Diverse Preferences, American Political Science Review, 93,
381-398.
[16] Gerber, A. and D.P Green (1998): Rational Learning and Partisan Attitudes, Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science, 42, n. 3, 794-818.
[17] Heath, A., R. Jowell and J.K. Curtis (1985): How Britain Votes, Oxford: Pergamon
Press.
[18] Heath, A., R. Jowell, J.K. Curtice and P. Norris (1999): The British General Election
Study, 1997, available at http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/.
[19] Larcinese, V. (2005). Does Political Knowledge Increase Turnout? Evidence from
the 1997 British General Election, STICERD Discussion Paper in Political Economy
and Public Policy, 1.
[20] Lassen, D.D. 2005. The E¤ect of Information on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment. American Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 103-118.
[21] Lazarsfeld, P., B. Berelson and H. Gaudet (1944): The peoples choice. New York:
Columbia University Press.
[22] Lupia, A. and M.D. McCubbins (1998): The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens
Learn What They Need to Know? New York: Cambridge University Press.
[23] Matsusaka, J.G. (1995): Explaining Voter Turnout Patterns: an Information Theory,
Public Choice, 84, 91-117.
31
[24] Matsusaka, J.G. and F. Palda (1999): Voter Turnout: How Much Can we Explain?,
Public Choice, 98, 431-446.
[25] Miller, W.E and J.M.Shanks (1996): The New American Voter, Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press.
[26] Milligan, K., E. Moretti and P. Oreopoulos. 2004. Does Education Improve Cit-
izenship? Evidence from the US and the UK. Journal of Public Economics 88:
1667-1695.
[27] Norris, P (2001): The British Parliamentary Constituency Database, 1992-2001.
Available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm.
[28] Palfrey, T.R.and K.T. Poole (1987): The Relationship Between Information, Ideol-
ogy, and Voting Behavior, American Journal of Political Science, 31, 511-530.
[29] Persico, N. (2004): Committee Design with Endogenous Information. The Review of
Economic Studies, 71(1), 165-94.
[30] Popkin, S.L. (1991): The Reasoning Voter. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
[31] Riker, W.H. and P.C. Ordeshook (1968): A Theory of the Calculus of Voting,
American Political Science Review, 62, 25-42.
[32] Rosenstone, S.J. and Hansen, J.M. (1993): Mobilization, Participation, and Democ-
racy in America. New York: McMillan Publishing Company.
[33] Sanders, M.S. (2001): Uncertainty and Turnout, Political Analysis, 9, 45-57.
[34] Wittman, D.A. (1995): The myth of democratic failure: why political institutions are
e¢ cient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[35] Wolnger R.E. and Rosenstone, S.J. (1980): Who Votes? New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
32
7 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1  =
R
[W (a) fW ]f(a)da:
Remember that
W (a) = max
fTg
T (P jV (a)  VI j   C)
and dene
W  = maxf0; P
Z
jV (a)  VI jf(a)da  Cg
Also fW = max
fTg
TP j
Z
[V (a)  VI ]f(a)daj   C)
which means fW = maxf0; P jZ [V (a)  VI ]f(a)daj   Cg
For  to be positive it is su¢ cient to prove that
maxf0;
Z
jV (a)  VI jf(a)da  C; 0g  maxf0; j
Z
[V (a)  VI ]f(a)daj   Cg
If we dene
A  = fa : [V (a)  VI ] < 0g
A+ = fa : [V (a)  VI ]  0g
then it is clear that
Z
jV (a)  VI jf(a)da =
Z
A+
[V (a)  VI ]f(a)da+
Z
A 
[VI   V (a)]f(a)da
j
Z
V (a)  VIf(a)daj = j
Z
A+
[V (a)  VI ]f(a)da 
Z
A 
[VI   V (a)]f(a)daj
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from which
Z
jV (a)  VI jf(a)da  C  j
Z
[V (a)  VI ]f(a)daj   C (A1)
If P
R jV (a)   VI jf(a)da  C then W  = 0: But then A1 implies that j R [V (a)  
VI ]f(a)daj  C and therefore fW = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 Let us indicate with bq 2 f0; 1g the fact of being ex post in-
formed (bq = 1) or not (bq = 0). For an uninformed citizen we have
Pr(T = 1 : bq = 0) = 0
while for an (ex post) informed citizen, the probability to vote (ex ante) is
Pr(T = 1 : bq = 1) = Pr(a : j[V (a)  VI ]j   C > 0)
=
Z
AI
dF (a) +
Z
AO
dF (a)  0
where AI and AO are the sets dened in (8).
If P [V (a)  VI ] > C and P [VI   V (0)] > C then Pr(T = 1jbq = 1) > 0:
The probability to vote is then given by the probability to be informed multiplied by
the probability to vote when informed, i.e.
Pr(T = 1jQ) = QPr(T = 1jbq = 1) (A2)
from which the result follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 3 From the A2 we have that
Pr(T = 1jE;M;w; r) = Q(E;M;w; r)Pr(T = 1jbq = 1)
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We also know from Proposition 1 that
@Q(E;M;w; r)
@E
 0
from which it follows that
Pr(T = 1jE;M;w; r)
@E
=
@Q(E;M;w; r)
@E
 Pr(T = 1jbq = 1)  0
Similarly we can prove the rest of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4 Let us focus on the positive part of the diagram in Figure 3.
Cases 3) and 4) refer respectively to weak and strong O-ideologies. This analysis
applies simmetrically to cases 1) and 2) (respectively strong and weak I-ideologies).
Consider rst a weakly O-ideological citizen. The value of information in such case
is given by the probability information will induce a switch to a vote for I plus the
probability it will induce a vote for O, i.e.
 =
Z
AI
(P [VI   V (a)]  C)dF (a) +
Z
AO
(P [V (a)  VI ]  C)dF (a)
Given two distributions F and G we want to prove that F > G ) F > G i.e.
Z
AI
(P [VI   V (a)]  C)dF (a) 
Z
AI
(P [VI   V (a)]  C)dG(a) +Z
AO
(P [V (a)  VI ]  C)dF (a) 
Z
AO
(P [V (a)  VI ]  C)dG(a) (A3)
> 0
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Dene s(a) = [V (a)  VI ]: Assumption 4 implies
 
Z
AI
Ps(a)[f(a)  g(a)]da 
Z
AI
C[f(a)  g(a)]da
+
Z
AO
Ps(a)[f(a)  g(a)]da 
Z
AO
C[f(a)  g(a)]da
> 0
)
 
Z
AI
Ps(a)dF (a) 
Z
AI
CdF (a)
+
Z
AI
Ps(a)dG(a) +
Z
AI
CdG(a) +Z
AO
Ps(a)dF (a) 
Z
AO
CdF (a)
 
Z
AO
Ps(a)dG(a) +
Z
AO
CdG(a)
> 0
) A3:
Now consider a strongly O-ideological citizen. The value of information is in this case
given by:
 =
Z
AI
2P [VI   V (a)]dF (a) +
Z
A
(P [VI   V (a)] + C)dF (a)
i.e. the value due to a potential shift to a change in favour of I plus the value due to a
shift in favour of abstention. Now we want to prove that F > G ) F < G i.e.
Z
AI
2P [VI   V (a)]dF (a) +
Z
A
(P [VI   V (a)] + C)dF (a) 
 
Z
AI
2P [VI   V (a)])dG(a) 
Z
A
(P [VI   V (a)] + C)dG(a) (A4)
< 0
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It is useful to adopt the following notation:
AI = [a;ba]
A = [ba;bba]
AO = [bba; a]
Integrating the A4 by parts we get:
2P [VI   V (ba)]F (ba)  2P [VI   V (a)]F (a) + Z
AI
2PV
0
(a)F (a)da+
+(P [VI   V (bba)] + C)F (bba)  (P [VI   V (ba)] + C)F (ba) + Z
A
PV
0
(a)F (a)da 
 2P [VI   V (ba)]G(ba) + 2P [VI   V (a)]G(a)  Z
AI
2PV
0
(a)G(a)da 
 (P [VI   V (bba)] + C)G(bba) + (P [VI   V (ba)] + C)G(ba)  Z
A
PV
0
(a)G(a)da
Now notice that
2P [VI   V (a)]F (a) = 2P [VI   V (a)]G(a) = 0
P [VI   V (ba)] = C
P [VI   V (bba)] =  C:
We are left with
2CF (ba) + Z
AI
2PV
0
(a)F (a)da
 (C + C)F (ba) + Z
A
PV
0
(a)F (a)da 
 2CG(ba)  Z
AI
2PV
0
(a)G(a)da 
+(C + C)G(ba)  Z
A
PV
0
(a)G(a)da
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Therefore
F  G =
Z
AI
2PV
0
(a)[F (a) G(a)]da+Z
A
PV
0
(a)[F (a) G(a)]da
But F (a)  G(a)8a which implies F  G:
Proof of Proposition 5 The proof in the case of weakly-ideological citizens proceeds
along the lines of the proof of proposition 2.
When agents are strongly-ideological we have, for uninformed citizens
Pr(T = 1jbq = 0) = 1
while for an (ex post) informed citizen, the probability (ex ante) to vote is
1 > Pr(T = 1jbq = 1) = Pr(aja 2 AI [ AO) =
=
Z
AI[AO
dF (a) > 0
Note that the probability to vote conditional on being informed is the same both for
strongly and weakly ideological citizens.
The probability to vote is then given by the probability to be informed multiplied by
the probability to vote when informed, i.e.
Pr(T = 1jQ) = QPr(T = 1jbq = 1) + (1 Q)Pr(T = 1jbq = 0)
= 1 Q(1  Pr(T = 1jbq = 1))
Proposition 5 follows from the fact that Pr(T = 1jbq = 1) < 1:
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Proof of Proposition 6 The probability of voting under the distribution function F is:
Pr(T = 1jF ) = QFPr(T = 1jbq = 1) + (1 QF )Pr(T = 1jbq = 0))
Consider two weakly O-ideological distributions F and G s.t. F > G. Then
F > G and QF > QG: Thus
Pr(T = 1jF ) = QFPr(T = 1jbq = 1) > QGPr(T = 1jbq = 1) = Pr(T = 1jG)
If instead F;G 2 FO then
Pr(T = 1jF ) = 1 QF [1  Pr(T = 1jbq = 1)]
Pr(T = 1jG) = 1 QG[1  Pr(T = 1jbq = 1)]
Now F > G ) QF < QG: Since 1   Pr(T = 1jbq = 1) > 0 we get that Pr(T =
1jF ) > Pr(T = 1jG):
The same applies to I ideological agents. Now notice that, if jV (a)  VI j is symmetric
around zero, then we can compare I-ideological with O-ideological agents and derive
that jF j > jGj ) Pr(T = 1jF ) > Pr(T = 1jG):
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8 Data Appendix
In all regressions I use some control variables whose coe¢ cients are not reported in the
tables and whose denomination is su¢ ciently self-explanatory: these variables are age,
married, sex, church attendance (categorical variable), income(categorical variable),
farmer, asian, black, lenght of residence in the constituency, houseowner, con-
tacted by a canvasser during the electoral campaign, contacted by phone,
voted in the previous election, regular reader of a quality newspaper, type
of economic activity (categorical variable), union member, UK standard region
(categorical variable). The precise denition of these variables can easily be found in
the British Election Study 1997 (BES) and therefore will not be discussed in this ap-
pendix. Other standard controls are taken from the 1991 Census and include district
unemployment rate and population percentage in the district with a univer-
sity degree. Finally, I include in all regressions the marginality of the constituency,
calculated as W R
W+R
, where W and R are the percentage of votes reported respectively by
the winning candidate and the runner up (the original data are taken from Pippa Norris
British Constituency Database).
I report below the precise denition of the the most important variables used in the
regressions.
 Information
The variable Information has been constructed by using the following two BES
questions:
1. Do you happen to remember the names of any candidates who stood in your
constituency in the general election this year?
Please write in all the names of candidates that you can remember (6 spaces provided)
or tick box: I cant remember any of the candidatesnames.
Note: the names of candidates written in by respondents were checked against o¢ cial
lists of candidates.
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2. Political knowledge quiz (answers: true/false/dont know):
a: Margaret Thatcher was a Conservative Prime Minister;
b: The number of MP is about 100;
c: The longest time allowed between general elections is four years;
d: Britains electoral system is based on proportional representation;
e: MPs from di¤erent parties are on parliamentary committees;
f: Britain has separate elections for the European parliament and the British parlia-
ment;
g: No-one may stand for parliament unless they pay a deposit.
Let us dene with names the number of candidates correctly reported and with quiz
the number of correct answers in question 2. INFO is then given by
INFO = names+ 0:66 quiz
The reason quiz has been downweighted is due to the fact that being true /false
questions, it was possible for respondents to guess the answer without really knowing it,
while this is not possible for names. Therefore, using Bayesrule we have (assuming the
prior probability of a correct answer is 0.5):
Pr(knowjcorrect) = Pr(correctjknow)
Pr(correctjknow) + Pr(correctjdon0t) =
1
1 + 0:5
= 0:66
 Turnout. Dummy variable equal to 1 if the responded voted in the 1997 election
(veried for most observations).
Hours. Derived from answers to the following question: Howmany hours (do/will/did)
you normally work a week in your main job, including any paid or unpaid overtime?.
 Ideology. Derived from answers to the following question:
In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself
on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?
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Ideology is then equal to 1 if the answer is 5, to 2 if the answer is 4 or 6, to 3 if the
answer is 3 or 7 etc. Respondents who answered cant chooseare excluded.
 Party-identication. Based on three questions.
1. Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the
others? If yes, which party?. Outcome: a) no; b) yes ! [party named].
2. Would you call yourself [party named] very strong, fairly strong or not very strong?
3. Which one of the reasons on this card comes closest to the main reason you voted
for the party you chose?
Then Party-identication is a categorical variable that assumes the following values:
Party-identication = 1 if the answer to question 1 is noor dont know.
Party-identication = 2 if the answer to question 2 is not very strong or dont
know.
Party-identication = 3 if the answer to question 2 is fairly strong.
Party-identication = 4 if the answer to question 2 is very strong.
Party-identication = 5 if the answer to question 2 is very strongand the answer
to question 3 is I always vote that way.
 Salience. This variable is based on articles collected from three national newspa-
pers (The Guardian, The Independent and The Times) during the last 30 days of the
electoral campaign. First, the total number of articles mentioning one of the candidates
has been collected (by newspaper and by electoral constituency). These numbers have
been weighted by the inverse of the total political articles appeared in each newspaper
during the same period. The variable Salience is then the average (across the three news-
papers) of the weighted number of articles appeared about a candidate in the electoral
constituency.
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Fig.5: Information score by party attachment
Fig. 1. Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Turnout 3199 0.7983745 0.4012767 0 1
Information 3199 4.267033 1.831907 0 10.62
ideological strenght 2770 2.367148 1.554779 1 6
party attachment 3199 2.751797 0.951436 1 5
hours worked 3199 37.80119 15.76359 0 95
news supply 3196 0.984336 2.632574 0 24.28772
age 3199 49.26602 17.8535 18 95
education 3199 3.515161 2.161623 1 7
married 3199 0.5886214 0.4921605 0 1
sex 3199 0.4573304 0.4982539 0 1
income 2902 7.002757 4.589678 1 16
asian 3199 0.0206314 0.1421693 0 1
black 3199 0.0078149 0.0880698 0 1
church attendance 3199 2.045639 2.631966 0 7
union member 3199 0.5804939 0.4935553 0 1
length of residence 3199 20.38387 18.29934 0 94
farmer 3199 0.0084401 0.091496 0 1
house owner 3199 0.6836511 0.4651235 0 1
canvasser 3199 0.2391372 0.4266234 0 1
phone canvasser 3199 0.0750234 0.2634704 0 1
voted in 1992 3199 0.8055642 0.3958276 0 1
quality paper reader 3199 0.1137856 0.3176003 0 1
marginality 3196 0.3024487 0.1939868 0.0051282 0.8140044
% degree in district 3198 6.011545 2.67873 1.494145 17.97613
% unempl. in district 3198 9.28633 3.949836 2.867953 22.48957
Note: summary statistics for economic activity and standard region of the 
respondents are not reported
Table 2: Voter Information (OLS Coefficients)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Information Information Information Information
Ideological strenght 2 0.467*** 0.434***
(5.00) (4.48)
Ideological strenght 3 0.555*** 0.520***
(6.05) (5.34)
Ideological strenght 4 0.434*** 0.407***
(3.97) (3.56)
Ideological strenght 5 0.281 0.288
(1.44) (1.48)
Ideological strenght 6 0.092 0.171
(0.64) (1.12)
Party attachment 2 0.090 0.077
(0.67) (0.53)
Party attachment 3 0.367*** 0.245*
(2.70) (1.65)
Party attachment 4 0.567*** 0.491***
(3.42) (2.77)
Party attachment 5 0.402** 0.360*
(2.14) (1.77)
Hours worked (weekly) -0.003 -0.002 -0.005* -0.006**
(1.08) (0.95) (1.76) (2.09)
News supply 0.031*** 0.022* 0.031*** 0.022
(2.66) (1.71) (2.59) (1.64)
age 0.084*** 0.105*** 0.090*** 0.116***
(5.98) (8.22) (6.11) (8.52)
age squared -0.065*** -0.087*** -0.070*** -0.096***
(4.51) (6.75) (4.67) (7.05)
education (foreign or other) 1.310* 1.194** 1.615** 1.507**
(1.77) (2.23) (2.08) (2.37)
education (CSE or equiv.) 0.221* 0.325*** 0.159 0.263**
(1.92) (3.10) (1.32) (2.37)
education (O level or eq.) 0.462*** 0.556*** 0.469*** 0.557***
(4.70) (5.94) (4.39) (5.48)
education (A level or eq.) 0.820*** 0.906*** 0.738*** 0.858***
(6.38) (7.77) (5.36) (6.74)
higher educ. below degree 0.836*** 0.920*** 0.764*** 0.858***
(7.69) (8.53) (6.52) (7.33)
education (degree) 1.291*** 1.431*** 1.186*** 1.407***
(10.32) (11.98) (8.69) (10.63)
Income no no yes yes
Observations 2769 3196 2459 2798
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.33
All regressions include a constant and the following control variables: married, sex, church attendance 
(categorical variable), income(categorical variable), farmer, asian, black, lenght of residence in the 
constituency, houseowner, contacted by a canvasser during the electoral campaign, contacted by 
phone, voted in the previous election, regular reader of a quality newspaper, type of economic 
activity (categorical variable), union member, UK standard region (categorical variable), marginality, 
district unemployment rate, district population percentage with a university degree.
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Voter Turnout (Probit Marginal Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Turnout Turnout Turnout Turnout
Information 0.045*** 0.064*** 0.042*** 0.058***
(4.77) (4.34) (4.24) (3.88)
Ideological strength 0.039** 0.038**
(2.38) (2.15)
Information x Ideology -0.006 -0.005
(1.47) (1.18)
Party attachment 0.115*** 0.109***
(4.85) (4.40)
Information x Party -0.012** -0.011*
(2.13) (1.92)
Hours worked (weekly) -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002***
(2.20) (1.98) (2.75) (2.62)
News supply -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.79) (0.36) (0.87) (0.17)
age -0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.002
(0.04) (0.70) (0.49) (0.53)
age squared -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.28) (0.37) (0.63) (0.39)
education (foreign or other) 0.107 0.140** 0.075 0.122*
(1.54) (2.41) (0.85) (1.65)
education (CSE or equiv.) 0.022 0.030 0.032 0.038
(0.84) (1.17) (1.13) (1.37)
education (O level or eq.) 0.031 0.041* 0.027 0.035
(1.28) (1.75) (1.02) (1.36)
education (A level or eq.) 0.013 0.025 0.009 0.015
(0.44) (0.88) (0.27) (0.49)
higher educ. below degree 0.029 0.031 0.034 0.033
(1.03) (1.14) (1.17) (1.13)
education (degree) -0.000 0.009 0.007 0.013
(0.01) (0.26) (0.17) (0.34)
Income no no yes yes
Pseudo-Rsquared
Observations 2769 3196 2459 2798
All regressions include a constant and the following control variables: married, sex, church attendance 
(categorical variable), income(categorical variable), farmer, asian, black, lenght of residence in the 
constituency, houseowner, contacted by a canvasser during the electoral campaign, contacted by 
phone, voted in the previous election, regular reader of a quality newspaper, type of economic 
activity (categorical variable), union member, UK standard region (categorical variable), marginality, 
district unemployment rate, district population percentage with a university degree.
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Voter Information in Conservative-Labour races (OLS Coefficients)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Information Information Information Information
Ideological strenght 2 0.448*** 0.372***
(3.57) (2.87)
Ideological strenght 3 0.563*** 0.484***
(4.86) (3.89)
Ideological strenght 4 0.363** 0.322**
(2.45) (2.08)
Ideological strenght 5 0.365 0.387
(1.39) (1.50)
Ideological strenght 6 0.054 0.077
(0.27) (0.37)
Party attachment 2 0.269* 0.303*
(1.69) (1.71)
Party attachment 3 0.569*** 0.475***
(3.50) (2.60)
Party attachment 4 0.764*** 0.744***
(3.73) (3.33)
Party attachment 5 0.684*** 0.652**
(2.87) (2.48)
Hours worked (weekly) -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
(1.16) (0.78) (1.28) (1.22)
News supply 0.047*** 0.019 0.037** 0.014
(2.97) (0.96) (2.22) (0.72)
age 0.090*** 0.110*** 0.094*** 0.119***
(4.78) (6.59) (4.78) (6.63)
age squared -0.068*** -0.091*** -0.072*** -0.099***
(3.60) (5.44) (3.69) (5.52)
education (foreign or other) 0.640 0.646 0.898 0.876*
(0.98) (1.62) (1.20) (1.70)
education (CSE or equiv.) 0.105 0.180 0.014 0.097
(0.69) (1.30) (0.09) (0.68)
education (O level or eq.) 0.459*** 0.529*** 0.448*** 0.506***
(3.61) (4.42) (3.26) (3.88)
education (A level or eq.) 0.935*** 0.966*** 0.853*** 0.904***
(5.40) (6.19) (4.62) (5.36)
higher educ. below degree 0.838*** 0.862*** 0.783*** 0.806***
(5.69) (5.86) (4.95) (5.02)
education (degree) 1.375*** 1.480*** 1.273*** 1.447***
(8.60) (9.86) (7.16) (8.52)
Income no no yes yes
Observations 1506 1754 1345 1546
R-squared 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.36
All regressions include a constant and the following control variables: married, sex, church attendance 
(categorical variable), income(categorical variable), farmer, asian, black, lenght of residence in the 
constituency, houseowner, contacted by a canvasser during the electoral campaign, contacted by 
phone, voted in the previous election, regular reader of a quality newspaper, type of economic 
activity (categorical variable), union member, UK standard region (categorical variable), marginality, 
district unemployment rate, district population percentage with a university degree.
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Voter Turnout in Conservative-Labour races (Probit Marginal Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Turnout Turnout Turnout Turnout
Information 0.053*** 0.077*** 0.052*** 0.066***
(4.10) (3.81) (3.85) (3.19)
Ideological strength 0.041* 0.044*
(1.92) (1.92)
Information x Ideology -0.007 -0.007
(1.35) (1.29)
Party attachment 0.136*** 0.128***
(4.22) (3.83)
Information x Party -0.016** -0.014*
(2.16) (1.78)
Hours worked (weekly) -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002***
(2.27) (2.28) (2.79) (2.84)
News supply -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001
(1.10) (0.76) (1.07) (0.25)
age 0.002 -0.001 0.006 0.001
(0.40) (0.18) (1.40) (0.22)
age squared -0.003 0.000 -0.007 -0.001
(0.80) (0.01) (1.62) (0.34)
education (foreign or other) 0.121* 0.155** 0.093 0.137*
(1.65) (2.57) (0.96) (1.79)
education (CSE or equiv.) 0.062* 0.063* 0.067* 0.074**
(1.90) (1.94) (1.91) (2.19)
education (O level or eq.) 0.047 0.062** 0.029 0.037
(1.46) (1.97) (0.83) (1.13)
education (A level or eq.) 0.044 0.061 0.047 0.053
(1.10) (1.63) (1.09) (1.34)
higher educ. below degree 0.025 0.045 0.032 0.047
(0.67) (1.21) (0.82) (1.21)
education (degree) 0.057 0.074* 0.060 0.070
(1.28) (1.75) (1.18) (1.47)
Income no no yes yes
Pseudo-Rsquared
Observations 1506 1754 1336 1546
All regressions include a constant and the following control variables: married, sex, church attendance 
(categorical variable), income(categorical variable), farmer, asian, black, lenght of residence in the 
constituency, houseowner, contacted by a canvasser during the electoral campaign, contacted by 
phone, voted in the previous election, regular reader of a quality newspaper, type of economic 
activity (categorical variable), union member, UK standard region (categorical variable), marginality, 
district unemployment rate, district population percentage with a university degree.
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
